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Prevention and Control of Tuberculosis
in Correctional Facilities
Recommendations of the Advisory Council
for the Elimination of Tuberculosis
Summary
The recommendations contained in this report update and expand previously
published recommendations for preventing and controlling tuberculosis (TB) in
correctional facilities (MMWR 1989;38:313–20, 325). The Advisory Council for the
Elimination of Tuberculosis (ACET) has prepared this report to assist officials of
federal, state, and local correctional facilities in controlling TB among inmates
and employees of both short- and long-term correctional facilities (e.g., prisons,
jails, and juvenile detention centers). Additional information about TB is avail-
able in the American Thoracic Society/CDC statements referred to in this report.
The transmission of  Mycobacterium tuberculosis in correctional facilities
presents a public health problem for correctional-facility employees and for in-
mates and the communities into which they are released. ACET recognizes the
urgent need to improve TB prevention and control practices in many correc-
tional facilities. All correctional facilities, even those in which few TB cases are
expected to occur, should designate a person or group of persons who will be
responsible for the facility’s TB infection-control program and the following
three essential TB control activities: a) screening—identifying persons who are
infected with M. tuberculosis or who have active TB disease; b) containment—
preventing transmission of M. tuberculosis and adequately treating persons
who have latent TB infection or active TB disease; and c) assessment—monitor-
ing and evaluating the screening and containment activities. Correctional-facility
officials should form close working relationships with their state and local health
departments, which can assist correctional facilities in formulating, implement-
ing, and evaluating these activities.
INTRODUCTION
Tuberculosis (TB) is a problem in correctional facilities in the United States, and
effective TB prevention and control in such facilities is necessary to reduce TB rates
and, eventually, to eliminate TB in the United States (1 ). This report provides an over-
view of this problem and general guidelines for preventing and controlling TB in both
short- and long-term correctional facilities.* In addition, this report describes the three
essential activities necessary for a successful TB prevention and control program (i.e.,
TB screening, containment, and assessment) and the roles of the correctional facility
and the public health department in achieving the goals of such programs.
During the past decade, the number of reported TB cases has increased substan-
tially in correctional facilities in some geographic areas of the United States. For
*A glossary is provided that defines these and other terms contained in this document.
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example, among inmates of the New York state correctional system, the incidence of
TB disease increased from 15.4 cases per 100,000 inmates during 1976–1978 to 105.5
cases per 100,000 inmates during 1986 (2 ). By 1993, this incidence was 139.3 cases
per 100,000 inmates (New York State Department of Health, unpublished data). In
many areas, rates of TB cases for prison populations were substantially higher than
rates for the total population. During 1993, the rate of TB cases for the New York state
correctional system (139.3 cases per 100,000 inmates) was more than six times the
rate for the total population of New York (21.7 cases per 100,000 persons) (New York
State Department of Health, unpublished data). Similarly, the incidence of TB disease
among inmates in New Jersey correctional facilities during 1994 was 91.2 cases per
100,000 inmates, compared with 11.0 cases per 100,000 persons in the state (3 ). In
one California state prison, the incidence of active TB disease during 1991 was 184
cases per 100,000 inmates—10 times greater than the statewide incidence rate. Trans-
mission of Mycobacterium tuberculosis also was documented in this California
prison (4 ).
In 1993, as part of expanded national TB case reporting, state health departments
began to report to CDC whether newly diagnosed TB cases occurred among persons
who were incarcerated at the time of diagnosis. Forty-eight reporting areas (i.e., 47
states and New York City) provided this information for ≥75% of the cases that oc-
curred in their areas. In these areas, 3.8% of TB patients for whom correctional-facility
status was reported resided in a correctional facility at the time of diagnosis (5 ). Dur-
ing 1994, 4.6% of TB patients in 51 reporting areas (i.e., 48 states, New York City, the
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico) were reported as residents of a correctional
facility at the time of diagnosis (6 ); in contrast, 0.6% of the total U.S. population were
confined in prisons and jails during 1994 (U.S. Department of Justice, unpublished
data). Thus, a disproportionately high percentage of diagnosed TB cases in the United
States occur among persons residing in correctional facilities. Furthermore, previous
studies have documented a high prevalence of TB infection among inmates, ranging
from 14% to 25% (7–10 ). Other studies have indicated a correlation between rates of
positive tuberculin skin-test results and length of incarceration, suggesting that trans-
mission may have occurred within correctional facilities (11,12 ).
Populations Affected by TB in Correctional Facilities
An increasing number of persons either work in or are confined in U.S. correctional
facilities. In 1980, one of every 453 U.S. residents was incarcerated; by the end of 1993,
that ratio had grown to one in every 189 residents (13 ). From 1980 through 1994, the
number of prisoners in federal and state correctional facilities more than tripled, from
329,821 in 1980 to 1,053,738 in 1994 (13 ); by mid-year 1995, this number had in-
creased to 1,104,074 (U.S. Department of Justice, unpublished data). At mid-year
1994, the most recent period for which jail data were available, 490,442 adults were
being held in local jails (14 ). Furthermore, recidivism is a problem for the inmate
population; in the 1991 Survey of State Prison Inmates, 61% reported a history of pre-
vious incarceration (15 ).
The transmission of M. tuberculosis in correctional facilities presents a health prob-
lem for both inmates and the communities into which they are released. In 1991, U.S.
jails released 9,929,347 persons, and state or federal jurisdictions released 436,991
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sentenced prisoners (16 ). Inmates infected with M. tuberculosis who develop active
TB disease after their release might infect other persons (17 ), including young chil-
dren, who are especially vulnerable to development of active TB disease if infected
(18 ) . In a 1991 survey of >20,000 state and federal inmates, 56% of men and 67% of
women reported having had at least one child; 6% of almost 39,000 female inmates
were pregnant when they entered prison (15 ). In addition, correctional-facility em-
ployees are at risk for occupational exposure to TB, and, if they develop infectious
disease, they might infect their families and other contacts.
In several recent TB outbreaks in correctional facilities, failure to detect active TB
disease in inmates resulted in transmission of M. tuberculosis to other inmates,
correctional-facility employees, and persons in the community (CDC, unpublished
data). Moreover, outbreaks in New York and California involving the transmission of
multidrug-resistant strains of M. tuberculosis (MDR-TB) to both inmates and employ-
ees of correctional facilities have been reported; during the outbreak in New York,
M. tuberculosis also was transmitted to health-care workers and patients in a nearby
hospital (19,20 ).
Factors Contributing to the Prevalence of TB
in Correctional Facilities
A primary reason for the high risk for M. tuberculosis infection and active TB dis-
ease in correctional facilities is the disproportionate number of inmates who have risk
factors for exposure to the organism or, if infected, for development of active disease.
These risk factors include infection with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), sub-
stance abuse, and being a member of a lower socioeconomic population that has poor
access to health care. The strongest known risk factor for the development of active
TB disease among adults who have latent TB infection is coinfection with HIV (21,22 ).
Persons who are coinfected with HIV and M. tuberculosis have an estimated 8%–10%
risk each year for developing active TB disease, whereas persons who are infected
with only M. tuberculosis have a 10% risk for developing active TB disease during
their lifetimes. Moreover, in HIV-infected persons who become infected with M. tuber-
culosis, the progression of latent TB infection to active TB disease is often rapid (23 ).
The prevalence of HIV infection and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS)
among inmates has increased substantially during the past decade, and the annual
incidence of AIDS among prisoners is markedly higher than the incidence among the
total U.S. population. In the New York state prison system, AIDS cases increased
steadily from three cases in 1981, a rate of 43 cases per 100,000 inmates, to 228 cases
in 1987, a rate of 574 cases per 100,000 inmates (24 ). Based on data from the U.S.
Department of Justice for 1993, 0.4% of the total prison population and almost 0.5% of
local jail inmates were confirmed as having AIDS; from 1991 through 1993, confirmed
AIDS cases in state and federal prisons more than doubled, from 1,682 to 3,765 cases
(25 ). During 1991–1992, CDC conducted a nationwide HIV seroprevalence survey that
included >70,000 blood samples from persons entering adult correctional facilities.
Among the inmates in these facilities, the median HIV seroprevalence was 2.9%
(range: zero to 14.9%); in comparison, during this time period, the overall HIV sero-
prevalence among civilian applicants for military service, a low-risk population, was
0.06% (26 ).
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HIV infection in inmates has been associated with previous injection of illegal
drugs, a risk factor more prevalent among inmates than among the total population
(25 ); in a 1991 survey of >20,000 state and federal prisoners in 45 states, 25% of the
inmates reported a history of injecting-drug use (15 ). Persons who inject illegal drugs
may be at increased risk for TB even if these persons are not infected with HIV, al-
though the reasons for this increased risk are unclear (27 ). The use of crack cocaine
also has been associated with transmission of both HIV and M. tuberculosis (28,29 );
19.8% of state and federal prisoners during 1991 reported a history of crack cocaine
use (15 ). However, even in the absence of HIV infection and the use of such drugs,
inmates are at increased risk for TB because a disproportionately high number are
from lower socioeconomic groups that have poor access to health care and a high
prevalence of TB infection (30 ).
Residents of correctional facilities also are at increased risk for TB because many of
these facilities have overcrowded environments conducive to the transmission of
M. tuberculosis (12,31 ). In the 1994 Annual Survey of Jails, the jails surveyed were
operating at 97% of their rated capacities (14 ). During 1994, according to U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice reports, state prison facilities were operating at 17%–29% above
design capacity, and federal facilities at 25% above capacity (32 ). During 1992, 118
(23%) of 503 jurisdictions* in which the jail populations were large (i.e., having an
average daily inmate population of ≥100 persons) had been ordered by a court to limit
the number of incarcerated persons or improve the conditions of confinement be-
cause of crowded living units (32 ). Poor ventilation, which is a problem in many
correctional facilities, also can promote transmission of M. tuberculosis to inmates,
correctional-facility employees, and visitors (12,31 ).
TB Prevention and Control in Correctional Facilities
Although the high risk for transmission of M. tuberculosis demonstrates the need
for effective TB control in correctional facilities, a 1992–93 survey of 82 correctional
systems in the United States indicated that policies for TB prevention and control in
some correctional facilities did not meet CDC’s recommended standards (33 ). Many
correctional facilities had comprehensive written protocols for TB control, but the ex-
tent to which these protocols were being practiced was not measured (33 ). The need
for improved health care in correctional facilities has been advocated by a position
statement from the American College of Physicians, the National Commission on Cor-
rectional Health Care, and the American Correctional Health Services Association (34)
and by others (35 ). Furthermore, several of the nation’s courts have determined that
inadequate TB control efforts constitute deliberate indifference to the medical needs
of inmates and that inmates have a constitutional right to adequate TB control in cor-
rectional facilities (33 ).
The Advisory Council for the Elimination of Tuberculosis (ACET) recognizes the ur-
gent need to improve TB prevention and control practices in all correctional facilities
and has prepared this report to assist federal, state, and local correctional officials in
achieving this objective. This effort also will require that health departments—which
have ultimate responsibility for TB prevention and control—and legislators devise and
implement innovative strategies in their jurisdictions. The implementation of these
*A jurisdiction is the territorial range over which a federal, state, or local governmental authority
extends.
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recommendations may require that stronger legislation and regulations be enacted
and adequate financial resources be allocated. These improvements in TB prevention
and control practices are essential for the following reasons:
• TB is spread through the air. One highly infectious person can infect others who
share the same air space.
• Immediate isolation of infectious patients can interrupt transmission of M. tuber-
culosis.
• Prompt initiation of an adequate regimen of directly observed therapy (DOT)
helps ensure adherence to treatment because either a medical worker, a specially
trained correctional officer, or a health-department employee observes the pa-
tient swallowing each dose of medication. This method of treatment can
diminish infectiousness, reduce the risk for relapse, and help prevent the devel-
opment of drug-resistant strains of M. tuberculosis.
• Inmates who are coinfected with HIV and M. tuberculosis are at high risk for de-
veloping active TB disease in comparison with inmates who are only infected
with M. tuberculosis.
• A completed regimen of preventive therapy can prevent the development of ac-
tive TB disease in persons who are infected with M. tuberculosis.
• Correctional-facility officials have an opportunity to treat inmates who have ac-
tive TB disease or latent TB infection before such inmates are released into the
community.
GENERAL GUIDELINES
TB control is an essential element in health care in correctional facilities. All correc-
tional facilities, including those in which few TB cases are expected to occur, should
designate a person or group of persons who have experience in infection control, oc-
cupational health, and engineering to be responsible for the TB infection-control
program in the facility. These persons should have the authority to develop, imple-
ment, enforce, and evaluate TB infection-control policies. If supervisory responsibility
is assigned to a committee, one person should be designated as the contact person to
whom questions and problems can be addressed. In multifacility systems, one person
should be designated to oversee TB infection-control activities throughout the sys-
tem. TB infection-control officials and all clinicians who treat inmates or employees of
correctional facilities should be familiar with this report, other American Thoracic So-
ciety (ATS)/CDC guidelines concerning TB (1,27,36 ), and the National Commission on
Correctional Health Care standards for correctional facilities (37,38 ). Medical facilities
within correctional facilities should conduct a thorough risk assessment and follow
the recommendations in the “Guidelines for Preventing the Transmission of Mycobac-
terium tuberculosis in Health-Care Facilities, 1994" (39 ).
Correctional-facility officials should form close working relationships with state
and local health departments. Health departments can assist correctional facilities in
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formulating, implementing, and evaluating the following essential TB infection-
control activities:
a. Screening (i.e., the measures used to identify persons who have active TB dis-
ease or latent TB infection):
• All correctional-facility employees and inmates who have suspected or con-
firmed TB disease should be identified promptly, and the case(s) or suspected
case(s) should be reported to the health department.
• Employees and long-term inmates infected with M. tuberculosis (i.e., those
who have positive skin-test results) should be identified and evaluated for pre-
ventive therapy.
b. Containment (i.e., the measures used to prevent transmission of M. tuber-
culosis):
• Persons suspected of having infectious TB disease should be placed immedi-
ately in an appropriate TB isolation room. A thorough contact investigation
should be implemented promptly.
• Persons who have suspected or confirmed TB disease should promptly begin
an adequate treatment regimen. Appropriate diagnostic, treatment, and labo-
ratory services should be available. All therapy for TB disease should be
directly observed.
• Persons infected with M. tuberculosis, especially those in high-risk groups,
should have a thorough medical evaluation and preventive therapy when ap-
propriate. Preventive therapy should be directly observed.
c. Assessment (i.e., the monitoring and evaluation of screening and containment
activities). Assessment procedures include the collection and analysis of data to
monitor whether the following activities are being implemented successfully:
• cases of active TB disease are detected;
• persons who have latent TB infection are identified and evaluated;
• cases of TB disease are promptly reported, counted, and recorded;
• persons who begin therapy for active TB disease or latent TB infection com-
plete a recommended course of therapy; and
• referrals to other correctional facilities or to health departments are made and
confirmed in a timely manner.
SCREENING
Screening Methods
The following methods are usually used to identify M. tuberculosis infection or ac-
tive TB disease. Additional information concerning these methods is provided in the
ATS/CDC document “Diagnostic Standards and Classification of Tuberculosis” (36 ).
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Symptom Screening
Screening for symptoms of TB disease is the first step of intervention in locations
where the prevalence of TB disease is high. Persons who have symptoms of pulmo-
nary TB (e.g., a productive, prolonged cough [a cough lasting for ≥3 weeks]; chest
pain; and hemoptysis [coughing up blood]) may be infectious. The index of suspicion
should be high when pulmonary symptoms are accompanied by general, systemic
symptoms of TB (e.g., fever, chills, night sweats, easy fatigability, loss of appetite, and
weight loss). Inmates should be interviewed systematically to determine whether they
have experienced symptoms in recent weeks. Inmates who have symptoms sug-
gestive of TB disease should immediately receive a thorough medical evaluation,
including a tuberculin skin test, a chest radiograph, and, if indicated, sputum examina-
tions. Chest-radiograph interpretations and sputum-smear results should be available
within 24 hours; skin-test results should be read 48–72 hours after administration of
purified protein derivative (PPD) by the Mantoux method.
During their initial medical evaluations, inmates should be asked if they have had
active TB disease or if they have been treated for latent TB infection or active TB
disease; this information should be recorded in each inmate’s respective medical rec-
ords. Any inmate who has a history of inadequate treatment for TB disease should
undergo a thorough medical evaluation. If an inmate has a positive skin-test result and
a diagnosis of active TB disease has been excluded, the inmate should be considered
for preventive therapy.
Chest-Radiograph Screening
A posterior-anterior view of the chest is the standard radiograph initially needed to
detect and describe chest abnormalities. Other views (e.g., lateral or apical lordotic
views) or additional studies (e.g., computed tomographic [CT] scans) may be neces-
sary for further evaluation. When chest-radiograph films are taken of women who
may be pregnant, lead shielding should be used to protect the pelvic and abdominal
area. Chest-radiograph interpretations for asymptomatic persons should be available
within 72 hours; whenever possible, radiography should be performed on-site to
avoid delays in diagnosis. Sputum-smear and culture examinations should be con-
ducted for inmates whose chest radiographs are suggestive of active TB disease,
regardless of their skin-test results.
Mantoux Tuberculin Skin-Test Screening
The preferred method of screening for TB infection is the Mantoux tuberculin skin
test using 0.1 mL of 5 tuberculin units (TU) of PPD. Multiple-puncture tests should not
be used to determine if a person is infected. Persons who have a documented history
of a positive skin-test result, a documented history of TB disease, or a reported history
of a severe necrotic reaction to tuberculin should be exempt from routine tuberculin
skin-test screening. Neither pregnancy, lactation, nor previous vaccination with Bacil-
lus of Calmette and Guérin (BCG) vaccine are contraindications for tuberculin skin
testing. The Mantoux skin test is not a recommended method of screening for active
TB disease; an average of 10%–25% of patients with active TB disease have a negative
reaction to the tuberculin skin test (40–42 ).
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The reaction to the Mantoux skin test should be interpreted by an experienced
worker 48–72 hours after the injection by measuring the area of induration (i.e., the
palpable swelling) at the injection site. The diameter of the indurated area should be
measured across the width of the forearm. Erythema (i.e., the redness of the skin)
should not be measured. All reactions, even those classified as negative, should be
recorded in millimeters of induration.
Generally, a tuberculin skin-test reaction of ≥10 mm induration is considered a posi-
tive result in inmates and correctional-facility employees. However, an induration of
≥5 mm is considered a positive result in persons in the following groups:
• close contacts of a person who has infectious TB (see Contact Investigation);
• persons whose chest radiographs are suggestive of previous TB disease;
• persons known to have HIV infection; and
• persons who are at risk for HIV infection, including injecting-drug users whose
HIV status is unknown.
Persons who have a positive skin-test result and no symptoms suggestive of TB
should be screened with a chest radiograph within 72 hours after the skin test is inter-
preted. Persons who have symptoms suggestive of TB disease should be evaluated
immediately (see Symptom Screening).
Vaccination with BCG, a TB vaccine used in many countries, can cause a reaction to
the tuberculin skin test. No reliable method can distinguish tuberculin reactions
caused by BCG from those caused by infection with M. tuberculosis. However, a diag-
nosis of M. tuberculosis infection and the use of preventive therapy should be
considered for any BCG-vaccinated person who has a tuberculin skin-test reaction of
≥10 mm of induration, especially if any of the following circumstances are present:
a) the vaccinated person is a contact of another person who has infectious TB, particu-
larly if the infectious person has transmitted M. tuberculosis to other persons; b) the
vaccinated person was born or has resided in a country in which the prevalence of TB
is high; or c) the vaccinated person is exposed continually to populations in which the
prevalence of TB is high (e.g., some health-care workers, employees and volunteers at
homeless shelters, and workers at drug-treatment centers) (43 ). A diagnosis of active
TB disease should be considered for BCG-vaccinated persons—regardless of their tu-
berculin skin-test results or HIV serostatus—if they have symptoms suggestive of TB,
especially if they have been exposed recently to infectious TB.
HIV-infected inmates who are at high risk for infection with M. tuberculosis and
who do not react to tuberculin may be evaluated for skin-test anergy. Anergy testing
is accomplished by using the Mantoux technique to administer at least two antigens
other than tuberculin (e.g., tetanus toxoid, mumps, or Candida) (44 ). However, the
scientific basis for anergy testing is not well established, and the skin-test antigens
currently used for anergy testing have not been standardized. Therefore, all HIV-
infected persons, regardless of whether they are anergic, should be screened with a
chest radiograph and further diagnostic evaluation if indicated. Medical and nonmedi-
cal personnel should safeguard the confidentiality of sensitive information while
screening persons for infection with M. tuberculosis or active TB disease.
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Two-Step Tuberculin Skin-Test Screening
Some persons who are skin tested many years after infection with M. tuberculosis
have a negative reaction to an initial tuberculin skin test, followed by a positive reac-
tion to a subsequent skin test; this phenomenon is referred to as a boosted reaction.
Boosted reactions to tuberculin skin tests are common in older adults and in persons
who have been vaccinated with BCG. To reduce the likelihood of misinterpreting a
boosted reaction as a new infection, two-step testing is used for baseline testing of
persons who periodically will receive tuberculin skin tests. If the result of the first test
is positive, the person is considered infected with M. tuberculosis; if negative, a sec-
ond test should be administered 1–3 weeks later. To eliminate one appointment, some
correctional facilities wait until 1 week after the first test both to interpret the reaction
to the first test and to administer the second test to tuberculin-negative persons. The
reaction to the second test should be interpreted 48–72 hours after the injection.
A positive reaction to the second test probably represents a boosted reaction and
is not considered a skin-test conversion. Persons who have a negative reaction to the
second test should be classified as uninfected. In persons who have a negative skin-
test result, a positive reaction to any subsequent test is considered a skin-test con-
version and is likely to represent new infection with M. tuberculosis.
Initial Screening
The following procedures should be used for the initial screening of inmates, de-
pending on their length of stay in the facility and the type of facility, and for all
correctional-facility employees, regardless of the type of facility.
Inmates in Long-Term Correctional Facilities
Symptom screening should be done as soon as possible for all new inmates. Any
inmate who has symptoms suggestive of TB should be placed immediately in a TB
isolation room and evaluated promptly for TB disease. In addition, tuberculin skin-test
screening of all inmates who do not have a documented history of a positive skin-test
result should be mandatory in long-term correctional facilities. Decisions concerning
the use of two-step skin testing for inmates entering the facility should be based on
the frequency of boosting in the facility; in some facilities, two-step testing may pro-
vide a more reliable baseline. Persons who have a positive skin-test result should be
screened with a chest radiograph and should be given a thorough medical evaluation;
if active TB disease is excluded as a diagnosis, preventive therapy should be consid-
ered for these persons. Regardless of their tuberculin skin-test status, inmates known
to have HIV infection, as well as inmates who are at risk for HIV infection but whose
HIV status is unknown, should have a chest radiograph taken as part of the initial
screening (Figure 1) (1 ).
Inmates in Short-Term Correctional Facilities that Provide Service 
to Populations at High Risk for TB
As in long-term facilities, symptom screening should be done as soon as possible
for all new inmates in short-term facilities. Any inmate who has symptoms suggestive
of TB should be placed immediately in a TB isolation room and promptly evaluated
for TB disease. Tuberculin skin-test screening usually is not feasible for short-term
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Entry into facility.
Screen inmate for symptoms of TB.
Inmate does not have symptoms. Inmate has symptoms. 
Obtain inmate’s medical history. 
Does inmate have a documented
history of a positive skin-test result?
Isolate inmate and evaluate 
for possible TB disease.
No Yes
Administer and interpret result 
of tuberculin skin test.*
If inmate has not completed treatment, obtain 
chest radiograph and evaluate for therapy—
especially if inmate is infected with HIV.
Skin-test result is negative. Skin-test result is positive.
Repeat skin test 
annually.
No Yes
Obtain chest radiograph and evaluate 
for possible TB disease.
Obtain chest radiograph 
and evaluate for therapy.
Determine whether inmate 
is infected with HIV or 
is at risk for HIV but has 
unknown HIV status.
†
*In some correctional facilities, particularly those in which the frequency of boosting is high,
the use of two-step testing for initial testing should be considered.
†HIV = human immunodeficiency virus.
FIGURE 1. Protocol for screening inmates for tuberculosis (TB) in long-term
correctional facilities
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inmates. However, long-term inmates who reside in short-term facilities and who do
not have a documented history of a positive skin-test result should be tuberculin
tested within 14 days of entry. Persons who have a positive skin-test result should
have a chest radiograph taken and should be given a thorough medical evaluation; if
TB disease is excluded as a diagnosis, the inmate should be considered for preventive
therapy. Regardless of their skin-test results, inmates known to have HIV infection, as
well as inmates who are at risk for HIV infection but whose HIV status is unknown,
should have a chest radiograph taken as part of the initial screening.
In some large jails, TB control officials should consider using on-site chest radiog-
raphy to screen all inmates, both short-term and long-term, for TB disease. Such
screening is particularly important for jails in which a) the prevalence of TB disease is
high, b) the inmate population changes rapidly, and c) the prevalence of HIV infection
and illicit-drug injection is high. Jail officials should consult the local TB control officer
for assistance in assessing the need for, and cost-effectiveness of, such screening. In
jails in which chest-radiograph screening is routinely conducted, long-term inmates
also should be tuberculin skin tested (Figure 2).
Inmates in Short-Term Facilities that Provide Service
to Populations at Low Risk for TB
Symptom screening is recommended for all inmates at time of entry into the facil-
ity. Any inmate who has symptoms suggestive of TB should be placed immediately in
a TB isolation room and evaluated promptly for TB disease. Correctional facilities
without an on-site medical facility should have a written plan to refer patients who
have suspected or confirmed TB to a collaborating facility that is equipped to evaluate
and manage TB patients (Figure 3).
When short-term facilities do not institute an extensive TB screening protocol, the
decision should be supported by a thorough assessment of the risk for M. tuberculosis
transmission in the facility. For example, screening for infection may not be indicated
in facilities in which the risk for exposure to and transmission of M. tuberculosis is
minimal; such facilities a) do not contain inmates who have infectious TB, b) are lo-
cated in communities in which no TB cases were reported during the preceding year,
and c) do not contain inmates who resided in areas in which TB cases were reported
during the preceding year. In contrast, more extensive TB screening may be necessary
if cases of drug-resistant TB have been reported in the facility or its community or if
the prevalence of HIV infection among inmates or employees at the facility is high.
Employees in All Correctional Facilities
A medical history should be obtained from and recorded for all new employees at
the time of hiring, and they should receive a physical examination. In addition, tuber-
culin skin-test screening should be mandatory for all employees who do not have a
documented history of a positive skin-test result. To improve the accuracy of the base-
line result, two-step Mantoux skin testing should be used for the initial screening of
employees who have not been tested in the preceding 12 months. Persons who have
a positive skin-test result should have a chest radiograph taken and evaluated and
should be given a thorough medical evaluation; if TB disease is excluded as a diagno-
sis, such persons should be considered for preventive therapy. All employees should
be informed that they should seek appropriate follow-up and screening for TB if they
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Administer and interpret 
result of tuberculin skin test.
Can chest radiograph be taken on-site?
At entry into facility, screen inmate for symptoms of TB.
Inmate does not have symptoms. Inmate has symptoms. 
Isolate inmate and evaluate 
for possible TB disease.
Obtain chest radiograph.Yes
Determine if inmate has 
short-term incarceration status.
Results are normal. Results are abnormal.
No Yes
Obtain inmate's medical history. 
Does inmate have a documented 
history of a positive skin-test result?
Take no further action unless
inmate develops symptoms.
No Yes
If inmate has not completed treatment, obtain 
chest radiograph* and evaluate for therapy— 
especially if inmate is infected with HIV.
Determine whether inmate is 
infected with HIV or is at risk for 
HIV but has unknown HIV status.
Obtain chest radiograph* 
and evaluate for therapy.
Isolate inmate and 
evaluate for possible
TB disease.
If no, repeat skin test annually. If yes, obtain chest radiograph* 
and evaluate for therapy.
No
Skin-test result is negative. Skin-test result is positive.
†
*If not obtained previously.
†HIV = human immunodeficiency virus.
FIGURE 2. Protocol for screening inmates for tuberculosis (TB) in short-term
correctional facilities that provide service to high-risk populations
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are immunosuppressed for any reason (e.g., HIV-infected persons, regardless of their
skin-test results, should have a chest radiograph taken and evaluated). Any employee
who has symptoms suggestive of TB should not return to the workplace until a physi-
cian has excluded a diagnosis of infectious TB disease.
Facilities in which the risk for infection with M. tuberculosis is minimal may not
need to maintain an ongoing tuberculin skin-testing program. However, administering
baseline skin tests to employees would enable medical staff to distinguish between a
skin-test conversion and a positive skin-test result caused by a previous exposure to
M. tuberculosis (Figure 4).
Follow-Up Screening
Long-term inmates and all employees who have a negative skin-test result should
have an annual PPD skin test. Persons who have a history of a positive skin-test result
and who have not completed a course of preventive therapy should be screened for
symptoms of TB disease. However, annual chest radiographs are unnecessary for the
follow-up evaluation of infected persons. Tuberculin skin-test results should be re-
corded in the person’s medical record and in a retrievable aggregate database of all
tuberculin skin-test results. Personal identifying information should be confidential.
The database should be analyzed periodically to estimate the risk for acquiring new
infection in the correctional facility; however, this analysis should be completed by
using only the skin-test results of a) employees and b) inmates who have remained in
the facility continually during the interval between skin tests. The tuberculin skin-test
conversion rate equals the number of employees whose skin-test results have con-
verted from negative to positive during a specific time interval (i.e., the numerator)
divided by the total number of previously PPD-negative employees who were tested
during the same specific time interval (i.e., the denominator). Conversion rates also
can be calculated for previously PPD-negative inmates who were tested during the
same specific time interval if these inmates remained in the facility continually since
their last skin test. In some facilities, data analysis of skin-test results for specific areas
or groups within the facility may be appropriate.
Additional investigation, and possibly more frequent testing, are needed when a
tuberculin skin-test conversion rate is substantially higher than previous rates. A
Entry into facility.
Screen inmate for symptoms of tuberculosis (TB).
Inmate does not have symptoms. Inmate has symptoms. 
Take no further action unless 
inmate develops symptoms.
Isolate inmate and evaluate 
for possible TB disease.
FIGURE 3. Protocol for screening inmates for tuberculosis (TB) in short-term
correctional facilities that provide service to low-risk populations
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cluster (i.e., when two or more tuberculin skin-test conversions occur in the correc-
tional facility and the epidemiologic evidence indicates transmission has occurred
within the facility) or other evidence of person-to-person transmission also warrants
additional epidemiologic investigation* or a revision of the facility’s TB prevention
and control protocol.
At time of hiring, obtain employee's medical 
history and screen for symptoms of TB.
Employee does not have symptoms. Employee has symptoms. 
Inform employee about the risk for TB 
and the need for further evaluation if 
immunocompromised.
Exclude from the workplace
and evaluate for possible
TB disease.
Does employee have a documented 
history of a positive skin-test result?
No Yes
Perform two-step tuberculin skin testing. If treatment has not been completed,
refer for evaluation.
First skin-test result is negative. First skin-test result is positive.
Refer for evaluation.
Second skin-test result is negative. Second skin-test result is positive.
Repeat skin test annually. Refer for evaluation.
FIGURE 4. Protocol for screening correctional-facility employees for tuberculosis (TB)
*For a detailed explanation of how to conduct such an investigation, see CDC’s “Guidelines for
Preventing the Transmission of Mycobacterium tuberculosis in Health-Care Facilities, 1994”
(39 ).
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Diagnosis
All persons who have a positive skin-test result or symptoms suggestive of TB
should receive a thorough medical evaluation, and a chest radiograph should be taken
and evaluated. A negative skin-test result does not exclude the diagnosis of active TB
disease, especially for patients who have severe TB disease or HIV infection. Abnor-
malities on a chest radiograph might suggest, but do not confirm, a diagnosis of active
TB disease. However, chest radiographs may be used to exclude the possibility of pul-
monary TB in a person who has a positive skin-test result but no symptoms of disease.
At least three sputum specimens obtained from a person suspected of having pul-
monary or laryngeal TB should be examined using an acid-fast bacilli (AFB) smear and
culture. A series of three specimens should be collected during the early morning on
different days. Sputum should be submitted for AFB smear and culture examinations
from persons who are diagnosed initially with other respiratory diseases (e.g., pneu-
monia) but whose symptoms do not improve within 14 days after initiation of
treatment. Aerosol induction can be used to obtain specimens if sputum cannot be
produced spontaneously. Precautionary infection-control measures should be used
during sputum collection, sputum induction, bronchoscopy, and other diagnostic pro-
cedures.
Detection of AFB in stained sputum smears examined microscopically may provide
the first bacteriologic indication of TB disease; however, smear examination enables
only the presumptive diagnosis of TB because the AFB on a smear may be mycobac-
teria other than M. tuberculosis. Furthermore, the sputum smears obtained from TB
patients might be negative for AFB. Smear examination is a rapid and relatively easy
procedure to perform; results should be available within 24 hours after the laboratory
receives the specimen. The results of the smear examination can be used to help de-
termine the infectiousness of the patient; patients whose sputum-smear results are
positive are considered infectious because they can expel many tubercle bacilli into
the air when they cough or sneeze.
A positive culture for M. tuberculosis confirms a diagnosis of TB disease. In the
absence of a positive culture, TB also may be diagnosed on the basis of clinical signs
and symptoms. When liquid culture media and rapid identification methods are used,
culture results are usually available within 2–3 weeks after specimen collection. For all
patients, the initial M. tuberculosis isolate should be tested for drug susceptibility.
TB can be difficult to diagnose in HIV-infected persons or other severely immuno-
suppressed persons (36 ). A high frequency of extrapulmonary involvement, usually
with concomitant pulmonary TB, is a striking clinical feature of TB in these patients,
especially in patients who have severe HIV-induced immunosuppression (45 ). The
chest radiographs of severely immunosuppressed persons who have pulmonary TB
might not have a classical appearance; for example, infiltrates without cavities in any
lung zone or mediastinal or hilar lymphadenopathy might be present. In rare situ-
ations, the chest radiograph of a severely immunosuppressed person who has
pulmonary TB disease may appear normal (46 ).
Vol. 45 / No. RR-8 MMWR 15
Case Reporting
All states require designated health-care professionals to report cases of TB to the
local or state health department; this reporting is mandatory for all correctional facili-
ties, whether private, federal, state, or local. Correctional-facility medical staff should
report any suspected or confirmed TB cases among inmates or employees to the ap-
propriate health agency in accordance with state and local laws and regulations.
Cases must be reported to access health department resources for case management
and for contact investigation in both the facility and the community. For each sus-
pected case of TB, the diagnosis or the exclusion of a diagnosis of TB should be
entered immediately into a) the person’s medical record, b) the retrievable aggregate
TB control database at the facility, and c) the database at a centralized office if the
system has multiple facilities. In addition, drug-susceptibility results should be sent to
the state or local health department for use in monitoring the rates of drug resistance
in the health department’s jurisdiction.
Contact Investigation
A prompt and thorough contact investigation is essential for the control of TB. Per-
sons who have confirmed pulmonary or laryngeal TB should be considered infectious
if they meet two criteria. First, the person either a) is coughing, b) is undergoing
cough-inducing or aerosol-generating procedures, or c) has had a sputum smear that
was positive for AFB. Second, the person either a) is not receiving therapy, b) has just
started therapy, or c) is having a poor clinical or bacteriologic response to therapy.
When a person who has suspected or confirmed TB might be infectious, close con-
tacts of that person should be skin tested unless they have a documented history of a
positive tuberculin skin-test result (1 ). Close contacts include persons who live with,
work with, or otherwise are frequently in close physical proximity to a person who has
infectious TB. These contacts are at highest risk for acquiring infection. Depending on
the ventilation in a correctional facility and the infectiousness of the index patient,
close contacts in correctional facilities could include all cell mates of the infectious
person, all inmates and employees on a tier or unit, and all inmates and employees in
a building.
All persons should be considered potential contacts if they could have been ex-
posed to the patient when the patient was likely to have been infectious. Contacts also
might include frequent visitors, inmates or employees who are no longer at the facil-
ity, and family or community members who were in close contact with the patient
before the incarceration. Contacts who are children or who have HIV infection should
be evaluated as soon as possible after the exposure.
Because the public health department is responsible for identifying and testing
contacts outside the correctional facility, the health department should be consulted to
help determine who should be screened for possible TB infection. To help identify
contacts within the facility, correctional facilities should maintain a tracking system
that documents inmate transfers, releases, and moves within a facility or system; this
information should be available, when necessary, to other correctional facilities and to
the health department.
If the skin testing of close contacts indicates that the rate of positive skin-test results
in this group exceeds the expected rate, the investigation should be extended to
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include persons who have had less frequent contact with the patient. Health depart-
ments should help determine when a contact investigation should be extended to
include such persons.
Contacts should be screened with a chest radiograph if they have a skin-test result
of ≥5 mm induration or symptoms suggestive of active TB disease; those persons who
do not have evidence of active TB disease should be evaluated for preventive therapy.
Contacts whose initial skin-test result is <5 mm of induration should be screened with
a chest radiograph and should be considered for preventive therapy in the following
situations:
• the contact is a child or adolescent;
• the contact is immunosuppressed, especially because of HIV infection;
• the contact was exposed to a person who was highly infectious (i.e., who had not
been treated for TB at the time of this exposure and who either a] had pulmonary
or laryngeal TB and a cough or was undergoing cough-inducing procedures,
b] had a positive AFB sputum smear, or c] had cavitation on chest radiograph);
• the environment in which the contact was exposed to M. tuberculosis was con-
ducive to transmission of the organism;
• M. tuberculosis was transmitted to other persons who had a similar degree of
exposure to the infectious person.
Contacts who have a negative reaction to an initial skin test should be retested
10–12 weeks after their last known exposure to M. tuberculosis. Preventive therapy
can be discontinued if the result of the second skin test is negative and the contact has
had no further exposure to infectious TB. Contacts who are infected with HIV should
be considered for preventive therapy regardless of their skin-test results (1 ). All in-
volved personnel should ensure the confidentiality of sensitive information during the
contact investigation.
If the sputum-smear result of a patient who has clinically active TB disease is nega-
tive, that patient probably is not infectious. However, if this patient could have been
infected recently with M. tuberculosis, close contacts of that person should be evalu-
ated to determine the probable source case and to identify other newly infected
inmates or employees.
CONTAINMENT
Isolation
Persons who have suspected or confirmed pulmonary or laryngeal TB disease
should be placed immediately in a TB isolation room that meets recommended stand-
ards (39 ). Moving a patient to another facility or hospital that has an available TB
isolation room may be necessary. TB isolation procedures can be discontinued if a
diagnosis of TB is excluded. If a diagnosis of TB cannot be excluded, the patient
should remain in isolation until the patient is determined to be noninfectious. Current
guidelines recommend daily monitoring of TB isolation rooms in use so that negative
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pressure is maintained and air is exhausted properly (39 ). No special precautions are
needed for handling the patient’s dishes, books, laundry, bedding, or other personal
items.
The length of time required for a TB patient to become noninfectious after initiating
TB therapy varies considerably. Isolation should be discontinued only when the pa-
tient is receiving effective therapy, is improving clinically, and has had three
consecutive negative AFB smears from specimens collected on different days. In pa-
tients who have drug-resistant TB, the response to treatment should be closely
monitored, and TB isolation should be maintained until noninfectiousness has been
determined. Prolonged isolation should be considered for patients who have MDR-TB
because these patients are more likely to experience treatment failure or relapse, both
of which can prolong infectiousness.
Because crowded living conditions and poor ventilation are conducive to the trans-
mission of M. tuberculosis, improvements in housing conditions can help prevent
outbreaks. Standard engineering controls are based primarily on the use of ventilation
systems, which might not prevent transmission of M. tuberculosis. These ventila-
tion systems may be supplemented with high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtra-
tion and ultraviolet germicidal irradiation (UVGI) in high-risk areas (e.g., temporary
holding areas and communal areas). HEPA filters can be used in ventilation systems to
remove droplet nuclei from the air. UVGI lamps can be used in ceiling or wall fixtures
or within air ducts of ventilation systems to kill or inactivate M. tuberculosis contained
in droplet nuclei. When HEPA filtration or UVGI is used, proper installation and main-
tenance are essential to ensure effective operation and reduction of potential health
hazards (e.g., conjunctivitis caused by UVGI overexposure) (39,47 ).
If inmates who are suspected of having infectious TB must be transported outside
their TB isolation rooms for medically essential procedures that cannot be performed
in the isolation rooms, they should be required to wear a surgical mask that covers
their mouth and nose during transport. Medical or security staff who transport infec-
tious TB patients in a closed vehicle or who must enter TB isolation rooms should
wear a personal respirator. A respiratory protection program, including education and
fit testing (i.e., testing for proper fit of respiratory equipment), should be included in
the correctional facility’s TB infection-control program (39 ).
Treatment
Current ATS/CDC recommendations should be followed for the treatment and man-
agement of persons who have suspected or confirmed TB disease (27 ). For most
patients, the preferred initial treatment regimen includes four drugs: isoniazid, ri-
fampin, pyrazinamide, and either ethambutol or streptomycin. Three drugs (isoniazid,
rifampin, and pyrazinamide) may be adequate for the initial regimen if the possibility
of drug resistance is unlikely. Drug resistance does not usually occur when the pri-
mary isoniazid-resistance rate in the community is <4% and the patient a) has not
been treated previously for TB, b) was not born in or has not resided in a country in
which the prevalence of drug-resistant TB is high, and c) has had no known exposure
to a patient with drug-resistant TB. Because pyrazinamide and streptomycin should
not be used to treat pregnant women, pregnancy must be excluded in women of child-
bearing ages before treatment for TB disease is initiated.
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For persons who have positive sputum smears or cultures at the initiation of ther-
apy, response to treatment should be monitored by smear and culture examination at
least monthly until the results are negative. Failure to respond to treatment usually is
caused by patient nonadherence to therapy, but it also can be caused by a drug-
resistant strain of M. tuberculosis. Drug-susceptibility testing should be performed on
all initial M. tuberculosis isolates, regardless of sputum-smear results. If cultures con-
tinue to be positive after 2 months of recommended therapy, or if the patient’s
condition does not improve or worsens, drug-susceptibility tests should be performed
again, and adherence to the prescribed regimen should be reassessed.
All patients should be monitored by trained personnel for signs and symptoms of
adverse reactions during therapy. A thorough medical evaluation is necessary if the
patient develops drug intolerance or has signs or symptoms of an adverse reaction. In
some situations, adjusting the regimen to enable completion of therapy may be nec-
essary. Expert medical consultation should be sought for monitoring and treating
patients who have complex psychosocial problems or associated medical conditions
(e.g., AIDS, diabetes, pregnancy, or extrapulmonary or drug-resistant TB). HIV coun-
seling and testing should be offered to all inmates who have active TB disease.
HIV-infected patients who have active TB disease should be monitored closely for
treatment failure, relapse, and adverse reactions to medications (27 ).
All inmates being treated for active TB disease should be on DOT to ensure adher-
ence to therapy. When DOT is used, TB medication may be administered either
a) twice weekly (with an appropriate change in dosage) after an initial period of daily
medication or b) three times weekly from the beginning of therapy (27 ).
Inadequate or interrupted treatment for TB can result in relapse, continued trans-
mission, and the development of drug-resistant disease. Therefore, after effective
therapy has begun, continued treatment without interruption is critical until patients
complete an entire course of therapy. If treatment lapses for any reason, prompt ac-
tion should be taken to ensure that therapy is reinstituted. If an inmate is to be
released or transferred out of the facility before completing therapy, the public health
department or receiving correctional facility should be notified as far in advance as
possible and should be provided with appropriate medical records to ensure contin-
ued adherence to and timely completion of therapy. Innovative efforts should be made
to encourage released inmates to complete treatment for active TB disease; such ef-
forts can decrease the number of TB patients who are lost to follow-up. For example,
among persons released from Rikers Island Correctional Facility in New York City, an
expanded outreach program and the use of incentives increased the percentage of
released inmates who went to follow-up medical appointments from <20% to
92% (48).
Preventive Therapy
The recommended regimen for preventive therapy in adults is a single daily dose
of 300 mg of isoniazid for 6–12 months. Regardless of their ages, persons in the fol-
lowing high-risk groups should be evaluated for preventive therapy if they have a
positive skin-test result:
• persons known to be infected with HIV who have a skin-test result of ≥5 mm
induration;
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• persons who are at risk for HIV infection (including injecting-drug users whose
HIV status is unknown) and who have an induration of ≥5 mm;
• persons who have had close contact with a person who has infectious TB and
who have an induration of ≥5 mm;
• persons who have chest-radiograph findings suggestive of previous TB but who
have received inadequate or no treatment and who have an induration of ≥5 mm;
• injecting-drug users who are known to be HIV negative and who have an indura-
tion of ≥10 mm;
• persons who have medical conditions known to increase the risk for TB disease
and who have an induration of ≥10 mm (see Glossary: Medical conditions known
to increase the risk for TB); and
• persons whose tuberculin skin-test result converted from negative to positive
within the preceding 2 years and who have a ≥10 mm increase in the size of indu-
ration if <35 years of age or a ≥15 mm increase if ≥35 years of age.
Persons in these high-priority groups should start a course of preventive therapy
unless treatment is medically contraindicated. In addition, in the absence of any risk
factors, correctional-facility employees or inmates <35 years of age should be evalu-
ated for preventive therapy if their reaction to the tuberculin skin test is ≥10 mm
(27,39). These persons should start preventive therapy only if they are likely to com-
plete a regimen of at least 6 months of preventive therapy (i.e., the correctional facility
has formal agreements with collaborating facilities and the local health department
for referral and follow-up upon transfer or release of the inmate).
Regardless of their ages, persons coinfected with HIV and M. tuberculosis are at
high risk for developing active TB disease. Therefore, HIV counseling and testing
should be offered to all inmates who have had a positive skin-test result. In addition,
HIV-infected persons, or persons who are at risk for HIV infection but whose HIV status
is unknown, should receive 12 months of preventive therapy if they have a positive
skin-test result.
Preventive therapy given to inmates always should be directly observed by a medi-
cal worker or other specially trained person. Because daily supervised therapy often is
not feasible, twice-weekly supervised therapy is suggested as a satisfactory alterna-
tive when directly observed preventive therapy is used. Twice-weekly intermittent
preventive therapy (using 15 mg/kg of isoniazid per dose, with a maximum dose of
900 mg) is considered to be safe and effective, although this therapy has not been
studied in controlled clinical trials (27 ). Medication should not be given to an inmate
without direct observation of drug ingestion. Before release or transfer of an inmate,
provisions should be made for the public health department or receiving facility to
oversee completion of an appropriate course of preventive therapy.
During the entire treatment period, persons receiving preventive therapy should be
monitored monthly by medical personnel for signs and symptoms of adverse reac-
tions. Because isoniazid-associated hepatitis occurs more frequently among persons
ages ≥35 years, transaminase measurements should be obtained for persons in this
age group at the initiation of preventive therapy and monthly during the course of
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treatment (27 ). Other factors associated with an increased risk for hepatitis include
chronic liver disease, daily use of alcohol, injecting-drug use, a history of discontinu-
ing isoniazid because of adverse reactions, or current use of another medication that
might cause interactions. Persons in some demographic groups might have an in-
creased risk for severe or fatal cases of isoniazid-associated hepatitis; case clusters
have been reported among both black and Hispanic women, particularly among His-
panic women during postpartum periods (49 ). Persons in these high-risk groups may
require more careful monitoring during preventive therapy; such monitoring might
include more frequent liver function tests. If any of these test results exceeds three to
five times the upper limit of the normal range, isoniazid should be discontinued and a
thorough clinical evaluation should be conducted promptly. Liver function tests are
not a substitute for monthly clinical evaluations or for the prompt assessment of pos-
sible adverse reactions that might occur between regularly scheduled evaluations
(27) .
Persons for whom TB preventive therapy is recommended but who refuse or are
unable to complete a recommended course of therapy should be counseled to seek
prompt medical attention if they develop signs or symptoms suggestive of TB. Rou-
tine, periodic chest radiographs of persons who have a documented history of a
positive skin-test result usually are not useful for detecting disease in the absence of
symptoms. Chest radiographs should be taken only if symptoms, especially a persist-
ent cough, develop.
ASSESSMENT
Inmates in large jails and prison systems are transferred frequently from one facil-
ity to another and from one unit to another within a facility. Thus, a retrievable
aggregate record system is essential for tracking all inmates and for assessing the
status of persons who have active TB disease and latent TB infection in prisons and
jails. This record system should maintain current information about the location,
screening results, treatment status, and degree of infectiousness of these persons.
The record system also should provide the information necessary to assess the over-
all effectiveness of TB control efforts. The following information should be reviewed
at least annually:
• the numbers of correctional-facility employees and inmates currently infected
with M. tuberculosis;
• the number of newly infected persons (i.e., those who have skin-test conver-
sions);
• the number of persons for whom preventive therapy was initiated;
• the percentage of persons who completed the prescribed preventive therapy
regimen, excluding those released from or transferred out of the facility;
• the number of diagnosed TB cases and the case rate;
• the percentage of persons in whom active TB disease was diagnosed who com-
pleted the prescribed treatment regimen, excluding those released from or
transferred out of the facility;
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• the number of infectious (i.e., smear-positive) patients; and
• the percentage of released or transferred inmates who kept their scheduled refer-
ral appointment.
In a multifacility correctional system, these data should be compiled for each facil-
ity, and for all the facilities in the system, and then provided to correctional-facility and
health-department officials. In large correctional facilities, analysis of the data by unit
may be necessary. ACET has established the following goals: a) at least 95% of per-
sons who begin preventive therapy should complete the prescribed regimen
(excluding inmates released from or transferred out of the facility); b) at least 95% of
persons in whom active TB disease is diagnosed should complete the prescribed
treatment regimen (excluding inmates released from or transferred out of the facility);
and c) at least 90% of released or transferred inmates should keep their scheduled
referral appointments.
ROLE OF THE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
The correctional facility should be responsible for in-facility TB screening, contain-
ment, and assessment unless otherwise mandated by legal statute. In all correctional
facilities, officials should work closely with the state and local health departments in
their jurisdictions. Correctional facilities, including local jails, should establish formal
written working agreements with health departments in their areas. These written
agreements should delineate responsibilities and specify procedures for the following
activities:
• screening and treatment of inmates,
• follow-up of symptomatic inmates,
• follow-up of inmates who have abnormal chest radiographs,
• contact investigations for reported TB cases,
• follow-up of inmates released before completing treatment for TB disease, and
• follow-up of inmates released before completing preventive therapy.
Correctional facilities also should collaborate with health department staff to provide
TB education and counseling to inmates and employees.
ROLE OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH DEPARTMENT
Public health departments should assist correctional facilities in developing and
updating policies, procedures, and record-keeping systems for TB control. The health
department also should provide access to expert TB medical consultation and ensure
that correctional facilities have access to adequate laboratory services. A specific
health department contact person should be designated to provide epidemiologic and
management assistance to correctional facilities. These duties initially may require
on-site consultation at the correctional facility. Small jails may need more direct
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support from the health department (e.g., to perform screening activities or adminis-
ter DOT).
Health-department personnel should assist in developing programs to train correc-
tional-facility personnel for activities such as a) performing, interpreting, and
recording tuberculin skin tests; b) identifying signs and symptoms of TB; c) initiating
and observing therapy; d) monitoring medication side effects; e) collecting diagnostic
specimens; f) educating inmates; and g) maintaining record systems. Some health de-
partments and correctional facilities have encouraged participation in such programs
by certifying correctional-facility employees who complete the training courses.
Health department officials also should provide educational information concerning
TB to senior-level prison and jail authorities and to county boards of supervisors and
other elected officials.
In addition, health departments should provide consultation for contact investiga-
tions for each case within correctional facilities and ensure appropriate examinations
for community contacts of persons diagnosed with or suspected of having active
TB disease in these facilities. Health department staff also should cooperate with
correctional-facility staff in identifying TB among persons who enter the correctional
facility and in arranging continued treatment of inmates who are released while re-
ceiving TB treatment or preventive therapy.
Health departments should maintain TB registries containing updated medical in-
formation on all current TB patients in their jurisdictions, including those in cor-
rectional facilities. Cross-matching information from the TB registry with the names of
inmates admitted into correctional facilities can help identify persons who have active
TB disease but who did not provide this information to correctional-facility personnel;
cross-matching also can help locate patients lost to follow-up (New York City Depart-
ment of Health, unpublished data). TB case records should be assessed quarterly, and
necessary revisions in policies or procedures should be recommended. The reported
information on TB cases among inmates and correctional-facility staff should be as-
sessed periodically by health departments to determine the communitywide impact of
M. tuberculosis infection and TB disease in correctional facilities.
Because inmates could be coinfected with HIV and M. tuberculosis, health depart-
ment officials should assist correctional facilities in developing and implementing
HIV-prevention programs that include strategies for a) identifying persons who prac-
tice high-risk behaviors, b) reducing high-risk behaviors among all inmates, and
c) counseling HIV-infected persons.
CONCLUSION
These recommendations will be revised periodically as necessary. They are not in-
tended to discourage new and innovative approaches in addressing TB prevention
and control in correctional settings, but should be used to enhance the quality of
medical care for all persons in correctional facilities.
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GLOSSARY
Active TB disease: Clinically active disease caused by organisms of the Mycobac-
terium tuberculosis complex, which are sometimes referred to as the tubercle
bacillus. Persons who have active tuberculosis (TB) disease usually manifest symp-
toms that differ depending on the site of disease. The symptoms of pulmonary TB
(i.e., the usual form of TB) include cough, chest pain, and hemoptysis; general
symptoms of TB include fever, chills, night sweats, easy fatigability, loss of appe-
tite, and weight loss.
Close contact: A person who lives with, works with, or otherwise is frequently in close
physical proximity to a person who has infectious TB.
Directly observed therapy (DOT): Therapy in which either a health-care worker, a spe-
cially trained correctional officer, or a health-department employee observes the
inmate swallow each dose of medication.
High-risk populations: a) Populations in which the prevalence of infection with M. tu-
berculosis is high (e.g., close contacts of a person who has infectious TB; persons
who were born in or have resided in countries in which the prevalence of TB is high;
medically underserved, low-income populations; residents of long-term care facili-
ties; and persons who inject illegal drugs) or b) populations that are at high risk for
developing active TB disease if they become infected with M. tuberculosis (e.g.,
persons infected with HIV, persons recently infected with M. tuberculosis, persons
who have medical conditions known to increase the risk for developing active
TB disease, injecting-drug users, or persons who have a history of inadequately
treated TB).
Infectious: Capable of transmitting M. tuberculosis. Persons who have clinically active
pulmonary or laryngeal TB disease can expel droplets containing M. tuberculosis
into the air. Persons are usually considered infectious if their sputum smears are
positive for acid-fast bacilli and they a) are not on therapy, b) have just begun ther-
apy, or c) are on inadequate therapy.
Inmate: Any prisoner, detainee, or other resident of a correctional facility, whether
adult or juvenile, sentenced or unsentenced.
Latent TB infection: A condition in which a relatively small number of living tubercle
bacilli (i.e., M. tuberculosis) are present in the body but are not multiplying or caus-
ing clinically active disease. Although infected persons usually have positive
tuberculin skin-test reactions, they have no symptoms associated with the infection
and are not infectious. However, infected persons remain at lifelong risk for devel-
oping active TB disease; preventive therapy can substantially reduce this risk.
Long-term correctional facilities: State and federal prisons, juvenile facilities, and
some jail facilities that house predominately long-term inmates, most of whom
have been tried and sentenced.
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Long-term inmate: An inmate who will remain in custody ≥14 days.
Low-risk populations: Populations that do not have risk factors for TB (see High-risk
populations).
Medical conditions known to increase the risk for TB: HIV infection, substance abuse
(especially injecting-drug use), infection with M. tuberculosis within the preceding
2 years, chest-radiograph findings suggestive of previous TB in a person who re-
ceived inadequate or no treatment, diabetes mellitus, silicosis, prolonged cortico-
steroid therapy, other immunosuppressive therapy, cancer of the head and neck,
hematologic and reticuloendothelial diseases (e.g., leukemia and Hodgkin’s dis-
ease), end-stage renal disease, intestinal bypass or gastrectomy, chronic mal-
absorption syndromes, and body weight ≥10% below ideal weight.
Negative pressure: A difference in air pressure between a corridor and an isolation
room so that a one-way flow of air into the isolation room prevents contaminated
air from leaving the isolation room and entering other parts of the facility.
Short-term correctional facilities: Jails, detention centers, and temporary holding
areas that house predominately short-term inmates, most of whom are awaiting
trial or serving brief sentences.
Short-term inmate: An inmate who will remain in custody <14 days, especially pretrial
detainees who probably will be released without supervision or placed in the com-
munity under court supervision.
TB case: A particular episode of clinically active TB. By law, TB cases must be reported
to the state or local health department.
TB isolation room: A single-patient room that has specially designed ventilation char-
acteristics appropriate for isolation, as described in the “Guidelines for Preventing
the Transmission of Mycobacterium tuberculosis in Health-Care Facilities, 1994"
(39). These rooms should maintain negative air pressure; thus, doors to isolation
rooms should be kept closed except when patients or personnel must enter or exit
the room. TB isolation rooms should have a sufficient number of air changes per
hour to enable a reduction in the concentration of droplet nuclei.
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